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  We attempt to clarify divisions made by us in previous work (Colander et al., 
2004a,b) between “orthodox, mainstream, and heterodox” in economics, following very 
useful remarks in Dequech (2007), whom we thank.  We also provide specific advice for 
heterodox economists, namely: worry less about methodology, focus on being economists 
first and heterodox economists second, and prepare ideas to leave the incubator of 
heterodoxy to enter the mainstream economic debate. 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
The authors are, respectively, Christian A. Johnson Professor of Economics at 
Middlebury College, Professor of Economics and Churchill Honors at Southern Oregon 
University, and Professor of Economics and Kirby L. Kramer, Jr. Professor of Business 
Administration at James Madison University.  We also further thank David Dequech for 
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Introduction 
In thinking about the issues raised in the paper, “Neoclassical, Mainstream, 
Orthodox, and Heterodox Economics” (Dequech, 200X), we were reminded of a 1938 
article by Lionel Robbins entitled “Live and Dead Issues in the Methodology of 
Economics.” In it, Robbins apologized for stating certain propositions that he believed 
were obvious, such as “the object of economics is to understand reality,” and argued that 
the difference between his definition and other definitions then current was not a very 
serious matter (Robbins, 1938, p. 344). 
The reason we were reminded of this article is because it is our sense that many of 
the divisions we made in our Changing Face of Mainstream Economics (Colander et al, 
2004a) were obvious, but too little remarked upon by most economists.
1 We did not feel 
we were breaking new ground, but were instead summarizing changes that were taking 
place in the profession that we felt should affect the debate between heterodox 
economists, but were not. It was our sense that too many heterodox economists were 
fighting battles against a neoclassical enemy that the best of the mainstream did not 
believe existed, and that that fight marginalized heterodox economists in these 
mainstream economists’ eyes, and made it almost impossible for these heterodox 
economists to convey their ideas to mainstream economists.  
We see ourselves as supporters of heterodox ideas as important and as worth 
considering. As supporters of heterodoxy, we have defended heterodox ideas to 
                                                 
1 This article served as the foundation for interviews with a series of cutting edge economists who straddled 
the line between mainstream and heterodoxy in Colander et al (2004b).  Others besides Dequech 
commenting specifically on our arguments have included Hodgson (2005), Davis (2006), Garnett (2006), 
Koppl (2006), and Lawson (2006). Live and Dead Issues In Methodology 
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mainstream economists, arguing that they should appreciate and recognize the 
contribution that heterodox economists have made, with little success. Our goal with that 
article was to convey to heterodox economists our sense of how ideas play out in the 
mainstream and the way in which categorization terminology is used. We wanted to 
reinforce the view, presented in Colander (2003) that fighting neoclassical economics is 
not a productive use of heterodox economist’s time. It is a dead methodological issue.  
We felt that picturing the economics profession as a complex adaptive system, in 
which new ideas were continually competing with old, provided a much better picture of 
the profession than did the static picture that existed in most heterodox and mainstream 
economists’ minds. In explaining our position we found it necessary to distinguish 
various groups of economists—putting a static image on a continually moving picture—
but we did not want to, and still do not want to, make too much of any particular division. 
The divisions we made are loose and arbitrary, and we could have chosen five or six 
different variations of those definitions, all of which would have conveyed the same ideas. 
But, we argue, precisely because the economics profession is a complex adaptive system, 
these groups should not be defined too carefully; they are continually changing as some 
ideas win out, and others lose. Precisely how the divisions are defined is not important to 
our central argument that the economics profession is a complex adaptive system, and of 
how, we believe, one can most usefully understand the profession, and advance one’s 
arguments within the profession. With that background, let us consider our agreements 
and disagreements with Dequech.  
 Live and Dead Issues In Methodology 
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Agreements and Disagreements with Dequech 
We see Dequech as a friendly critic who wants to clear up our categories and 
amend them slightly. One area where he succeeds in pinpointing a certain ongoing 
ambivalence and evolution of thought on our part involves the role of the elite within the 
mainstream, even though we feel that he overstates the differences between his and our 
views of the sociological aspects of the mainstream.
2 In our work, we defined the 
mainstream charitably—arguing that it should be defined by the best of the mainstream, 
which is often embodied in the profession’s elite. We agree that such a definition places 
the mainstream in the best possible light, and misses the mindless focus on rankings 
rather than content and ideas in judging the value of research an of economists that can 
become effectively repressive. An example of such a mindless focus on ranking was what 
happened at Notre Dame, where the economics graduate program was separated from the 
heterodox economists even though the work that heterodox economists were doing was 
more closely aligned with the mission statement of that Catholic university, and even 
though the heterodox program was supported by leading mainstream economists such as 
Robert Solow (McCloskey, 2003). But, we argue, the best of the mainstream knows this 
narrow-mindedness for what it is, and agrees with heterodox economists that many in the 
mainstream are not as open-minded as they should be, just as the best of the heterodox 
knows that many heterodox economists are not as open-minded as they should be.  
                                                 
2 In particular he emphasizes the importance of the mainstream having power. We agree that this is an 
important aspect of what it means to be in the mainstream. Live and Dead Issues In Methodology 
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Our intention was that our definition would encourage heterodox economists to 
direct their arguments at the best of the mainstream because they are the ones who are 
most open to heterodox ideas. This point was perhaps most sharply made in our interview 
with Kenneth Arrow (Colander et al, 2004b, p. 298) where he discusses the case of 
heterodox economist, Samuel Bowles, being turned down for tenure at Harvard in the 
1970s. He points out that the three former presidents of the AEA and the Nobel Prize 
winners involved in the decision all supported Bowles.
3 
  We agree that one could define the categories differently; for example, we could 
have identified a mainstream orthodoxy. One reason we resisted specifically categorizing 
such a group was precisely because we were trying to highlight the non-orthodox nature 
of the elite and cutting edge portions of the sociologically mainstream. We do not deny 
that a portion of the mainstream would adhere to the intellectual apparatus of what might 
be called orthodoxy, but we do deny that this “orthodox” group controls the cutting edge 
of research, and that the mainstream can reasonably be defined by this narrow 
orthodoxy.
4 
                                                 
3 This raises the curious point that even someone who looks like part of the elite from the outside may not 
feel like it from the inside and may maintain an alienated heterodox stance. This would appear to hold for 
several Nobel Prize winners even after they received these presumably highest marks of approval by the 
profession, with Herbert Simon apparently being one as reported by his student, Robert Axtell, in his 
interview with us (Colander et al, 2004b, p. 253). At Carnegie Mellon, Simon worked mostly in the 
psychology and computer science departments, avoiding the Graduate School of Industrial Administration 
because it was “being taken over by economists.” In contrast, in his interview with us (Colander et al, 
2004b, p. 103), Herbert Gintis recognized that he is widely viewed as being heterodox, but declared that “I 
don’t like to be thought of as heterodox…I’m just a traditional scientist,” and has in more than one setting 
verbally declared himself to be “homodox.” 
4 In this regard there may be a disjuncture developing between microeconomics and macroeconomics. 
Many of the developments that we document involve microeconomics, where there has been a tremendous 
weakening of the previous orthodoxy in many ways. However, it could be argued that this older micro 
orthodoxy has had a revival in the apparent emergence of the newly orthodox version of macroeconomics 
based upon parts of it, the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model (see Colander, 2006 for a critique). Live and Dead Issues In Methodology 
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  For us, orthodoxy constitutes an ossification of what was formerly the cutting 
edge. Its existence as a coherent intellectual whole is generally most strongly expressed 
in textbooks at the upper undergraduate and at the graduate levels, depending on the sub-
field of economics. In a complex adaptive system, as we think the economics profession 
is, the areas of research interest are continually changing, and those who adhere to 
orthodoxy are not those who are at the cutting edge. The genuinely creative and 
innovative researchers are continually looking to overturn any orthodoxy that develops. 
That is why we downplayed the “neoclassical” categorization. 
  Another issue discussed in Dequech that we differ with is Lawson’s (2003) 
ontological specification of the divide between heterodoxy and mainstream (although 
Dequech does not support Lawson’s position),
5 with heterodox approaches concentrating 
on open systems and the mainstream concentrating on closed systems, a view supported 
by Dow (1999), Moore (2006), and Davidson (1996).
6 We agree that the economy is best 
seen as an open system, and that the mainstream has tended to concentrate on closed 
systems. But we believe that the reason for that is that they did not have the tools to 
analyze open systems, not that they did not believe the economic system was open.
7 Thus, 
the assumption of a closed system is not a defining element of the mainstream.  
                                                 
5 We note that Lawson identifies mainstream with orthodoxy.  Lawson (2006) also identifies mainstream 
with mathematization, especially of a Bourbakist or “formalistic-deductivist” approach.  We disagree, 
noting Weintraub’s (2002) discussion of Bourbakist formalism reaching a peak in mathematics in mid-20
th 
century; with other more applied approaches now more important (Rosser, 2003).  Thus, such heterodox 
economists as the Marxists, Duménil and Lévy (2003), use mathematical methods that are not Bourbakist-
formalist.  
6 Davidson (1996) has argued that Keynesian uncertainty is ontological, although he has tied this to an 
axiomatic view rather than the concept of openness of a system.   
7 Rosser (2006) has argued that complexity is an ontological foundation of Keynesian uncertainty, and that 
it is not necessarily tied to a system being open versus closed. It is an essential feature of complex Post 
Keynesian dynamics that they are endogenously generated by the system rather than arriving exogenously 
from outside the system as in the New Classical and DSGE approaches. Indeed, Rosser (2006) has argued Live and Dead Issues In Methodology 
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In our view the mainstream has not given appropriate credit to Post Keynesians 
for their insights into the openness of the economy as is demonstrated by the standard 
mainstream histories of macroeconomics such as Blanchard (2000) or Woodford (2000) 
failing to mention Post Keynesians. In our discussions of the evolution of 
macroeconomic thought (Colander and Landreth, 1996; Colander, 2006; Rosser, 2006) 
we have argued that macro can only be thought of within a complex system framework, 
and that Post Keynesians are the one group that has consistently done so.
8 
Our Broader Message 
We recognize that our views may have come across as anti-heterodox. Let us say 
specifically that that was not our intent. Two of us think of ourselves first as heterodox 
economists, and the third is highly sympathetic to heterodox ideas of all persuasions.
9 
The economics profession would be far better off if it took heterodox ideas more 
seriously, and our interest in shaking up heterodoxy is grounded in our belief that what 
they have to say is important and should be considered by the mainstream. Our concern is 
that heterodox ideas are not getting the hearing they should. We believe that the 
                                                                                                                                                 
at length that Post Keynesian models from the 1930s to 1950s served crucial roles in the formation of the 
understanding of complex dynamics by many modern economists. 
8We note however that Davidson (1996) has rejected complexity as a foundation for uncertainty as being 
merely epistemological.  Davidson effectively argues that complexity is not fundamentally a Keynesian 
concept, a view we disagree with (Colander, 1998; Rosser, 1998, 2006). Ironically, Blume and Durlauf 
(2006, p. 2) argue that complex models may not “represent a rejection of neoclassical economics,” that it 
has been able to absorb these approaches, a view that both Rosser (forthcoming) and Colander 
(forthcoming) dispute.  
9 The ideas in our paper and book originated in discussions on the PKT-net and at a Post Keynesian 
seminar, and we all believe that heterodox economists have made, and continue to make, important 
contributions that the profession does not recognize The question of who is a what among us was discussed 
with some irony in the Preface to our book (2004b, p. viii) where it was noted that “Dave told Barkley that 
Barkley was no heterodox economist, as he had always pictured himself, but instead just another 
mainstream economist.” Barkley still likes to think of himself as heterodox, and in many ways he is very 
heterodox, but by our definition, because his work is taken seriously by the mainstream, and the approach 
he takes is seen by the mainstream as legitimate, he is not heterodox, but mainstream. Live and Dead Issues In Methodology 
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mainstream should recognize heterodoxy’s importance that goes beyond ideology (see 
Holt and Pressman, 1998). The profession needs people to tell it that there is a better way 
to do economics, and a better way to be an economist. It is what keeps the profession 
honest.  
Pluralism does not come easy to any in power, and calls for pluralism inevitably 
come from the marginalized, which is what heterodox economists have become. If you 
believe in the correctness of your ideas, you don’t want pluralism; you want your ideas to 
win out because they are correct. The best one can hope for in terms of pluralism is a 
level playing field so that ideas can compete. That level playing field can only be 
achieved if everyone knows the pitch one is playing on. That’s what we tried to do in our 
article—convey to people the pitch, in the hope of making a more effective heterodoxy.  
We argued in our Changing Face of Mainstream Economics that change in 
economics was unlikely to come through a Kuhnian paradigm shift that replaced a 
neoclassical orthodoxy with a heterodox alternative. Instead, the change would come 
from within, and it is already ongoing. If heterodox economics wants to affect that 
change, it must deal with that reality, and see that its ideas get a hearing at the edge of 
economics where the new ideas are sprouting.  
  Just as the mainstream is a complex adaptive system, so too is heterodoxy. It is 
constantly changing and has many different dimensions to it. Most heterodoxy today has 
developed in a way so it exists in a different niche than the mainstream. We have no 
problem with that, and perhaps one of these groups will grow sufficiently so that it can 
become the new mainstream. However, we see that as highly unlikely. Instead, we see it Live and Dead Issues In Methodology 
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as likely that each successive generation of these “outside the mainstream heterodox 
economists,” will become more and more marginalized. We wrote the paper because we 
believe that there is a different way—that there can and should be many more “inside the 
mainstream heterodox economists” than there currently are. “Inside the mainstream 
heterodox economists” are much harder to marginalize. Our article and book were 
designed to influence the internal dynamics of heterodoxy, and to change how young 
heterodox economists see their role. Our goal was to encourage the development of 
young heterodox economists whom the mainstream will find harder to marginalize, and 
our book was essentially some implicit advice for young heterodox economists. That 
advice was probably a bit too implicit, so let us state it a bit more explicitly.  
  If a heterodox economist wants to be listened to by the mainstream, some rules 
she or he should follow are: 
•  Don’t worry about methodology. Unless you are a philosopher specializing in 
methodology, just about everything to be said about methodology has been said. 
To think that anyone but a specialist is going to have much to add on 
methodology is similar to a neophyte thinking he can do better than an index fund 
in investing. Only long-in tooth, (or almost long-in tooth) economists such as us 
are given a pass to write on methodology. But even for this group, such writings 
are not highly valued as research output, and are considered a diversion from 
doing real economics, on a par with golf, although golf probably gets slightly 
higher value. Live and Dead Issues In Methodology 
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•  Do not worry about divisions within economics; we are all economists. There are 
many dimensions of economics, and depending on the dimension that is being 
emphasized one will come up with different divisions. The three of us are 
mainstream, orthodox, and heterodox economists simultaneously, as we believe 
the majority of economists are. That multidimensionality means that dividing 
economists up into such groupings is not a fruitful exercise—economists are 
economists, and at any one time some ideas are winning out and others not. To 
differentiate out a group of economists as heterodox frees them to not deal with 
the fact that their ideas are not winning out, and to place the blame for it on the 
rigidity of the mainstream orthodoxy. We agree there is such rigidity, but we also 
believe that that rigidity is simply reflective of the rigidity of power of any group 
in power, and something that heterodox economists are going to have to live with.  
•  Be preparing your ideas to leave the incubator. Our goal in writing our book and 
paper was to encourage heterodox economists to get into the mainstream 
conversation—to argue that it is not the ideas that one has that are held out, but 
rather the method one uses to present them. Ideas compete in an institutional 
environment (controlled by the mainstream) and if ideas are to win out, they have 
to compete in that mainstream institutional environment. Heterodox environments 
are like incubators for ideas, and often heterodox ideas grow nicely in that 
incubator. But at some point, the ideas must be taken from the incubator and left 
to play in the mainstream institutional environment if they are to influence the 
mainstream. It was to encourage heterodox economists to leave the incubator that 
we chose our definition of mainstream and orthodoxy, giving wide latitude to Live and Dead Issues In Methodology 
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mainstream, and emphasizing the ideas on the cutting edge as the ideas in play.  
        We fully agree that the textbook presentations are believed by some 
economists, and that these textbook ideas are in the mainstream pedagogy. But if 
anyone were to actually try to publish a paper based on these, or use them directly 
in their research, they would be out of the mainstream. It is just not part of the 
research journal discussion. Criticizing textbook ideas as a description of what the 
mainstream believes is not a productive endeavor. The comparative advantage 
heterodoxy has over the orthodoxy is its willingness to constantly question ideas 
and foundations of economics. Often, the mainstream, in its focus on narrow 
issues, loses sight of these foundations, and thus need to be reminded of them.  
The best or the elite in the mainstream encourage this questioning as long as it is 
done with what the mainstream believes is a deep understanding of what those 
foundational questions are. So our argument was that if one is to criticize and 
have that criticism considered by the mainstream, criticize the best of the 
mainstream, and do it with a deep understanding what they believe; don’t criticize 
a straw man to be found in the textbook. That suggestion holds no matter what 
specific definition of the terms one chooses.  
•  Think of yourself as an economist first, and as a heterodox economist second. The 
last suggestion for heterodox economists that we suggest is to think of yourself 
primarily as an economist rather than as a heterodox economist. Doing so will 
lead to less thinking about methodology, and more thinking about substantive 
issues. In our view, doing so will make both those who consider themselves 
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